looked, if the police authorities received a douceur. . . There was, in fact, the same experience that modern theorists accentuate: that laws, in order to be obeyed, must be reasonable: that a ridiculous rigour defeats its own object, penalising the law-abiding at the expense of the less responsible elements: that the multiplicity of galling restrictions tends to bring the fundamental laws of security and government into disrepute.

This generalisation applies all the more when the restrictions are of a definitely unethical character, as were so many of those from which the Jew suffered. The result was what might have been expected—the growth of evasion, of sharp practice, of petty deceit, a perpetual state of suspicion and grievance against those responsible for the hard lot of the victim, a feeling of contempt for the laws which they enacted. This sentiment continued, in some unhappy cases, after the justification had passed. But the wonder is, that in the majority of instances it should have disappeared so rapidly.[1]

§v

Yet the relations which prevailed between the Jews and their neighbours were friendly enough, when no outside pressure was brought to bear; and their services were appreciated in the most unlikely quarters. Two or three examples may be adduced. In the eleventh century, Riidiger, Bishop of Speyer, ambitious for the

[1] On the other side, it is possible to adduce instances of an exaggerated

scrupulosity. The story is told, for example, of a saintly Russian rabbi of the last century, who made a practice of destroying a postage-stamp every time he sent a note by hand, as the Post was a government monopoly! Such in fact was the general delicacy of feeling that no man was admitted to pray with the congregation on the Day of Atonement until he had been formally absolved from ill-considered vows which he had hastily taken on himself during the year and which were clearly impossible of fulfilment. (This is the origin of the much-maligned *Kol Nidrei* formula.)